The kirpan, understood by the Sikhs as a symbol of wisdom and defence of the forces of light, peace and justice, has repeatedly been the protagonist of the Italian legal debate because, being materially configured as a knife, albeit a symbolic and ritual one, it has often come into conflict with the regulations governing the carrying of weapons and offensive objects in public in Italy.
Initially, a certain openness developed, similar to that which occurred in other Western states,[1] mostly by a part of the jurisprudence of merit[2] that recognised the inoffensiveness of the ritual dagger and its unsuitability to be used as an assault weapon, precisely because of its beneficial value in the religion of origin. For these reasons, the existence of justified motive, referred to in the same legislation on the carrying of offensive objects, was found to exist, and thanks to this, it was considered lawful to wear it in public places, as it is a fundamental element of the Sikh religion.
Subsequently, however, these positions were not upheld by the jurisprudence of legitimacy, which instead ruled quite the opposite and punished the wearing of the kirpan in public.
In these pronouncements, the Sikhs are always challenged on the grounds of the incompatibility of carrying the ritual dagger in public places, in contrast to Article 4, Section II of Law No. 110 of 1975.[3] The religious motive put forward by the Sikhs, who were suppressed in the proceedings, is not considered by the Court of Cassation as a justified motive. The characteristics of the ritual dagger in any case make it an improper weapon and as such incapable of responding to those "particular needs that lead one to carry the weapon outside the home," which, according to the Court of Cassation, should have corresponded to behavioural rules that were in any case lawful, in relation to the nature of the object, the manner in which the fact occurred, the subjective conditions of the bearer, the places of the event, and the normal function of the object (Cass. Pen, sec. I - 24/02/2016, no. 25163, Cass. Pen., sec. I - 01/03/2016, no. 24739). All these elements were not assumed to be supplemented by the mere religious justification.
The discourse on kirpan was then settled in a 2017 ruling (Cass. Pen. sez. I - 31/03/2017, no. 24084), discussed in detail in the opinion.[4] This decision, in addition to not recognising the religious motive as justifying the violation of the rule referred to, deepens the discourse on the level of values, only mentioned by the previous pronouncements, and reiterating the contrast in the case at hand between religious freedom and the protection of public safety and peaceful coexistence, as well as the consequent prevalence of the latter over the former and the need for foreign subjects to conform to the values of the host culture.
The case of the kirpan actually raises more complex issues: in the balancing act, together with religious freedom, the principle of the secularity of the state is also involved (Constitutional Court 203/1989), which would presuppose state intervention capable of recomposing the diatribe between cultural practice and legal norms, together with the protection of pluralism and identity rights guaranteed by Article 2 of the Constitution; public order, security or peaceful coexistence are not protected in the Constitution as primary or 'tyrannical' values, they have a very discretionary connotation that constitutional jurisprudence has often sought to anchor to the legislative instrument.[5] 
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The principle of the proportionality of the limits that may be imposed on religious freedom would also play a role in the case, due to the fact that it succumbs under the axe of a contravention, which provides for particularly serious punishments[6] and generically refers to the concept of justified motive, thus offering a wide discretion to the interpreter. The discretion is such that the same criteria that case law uses in all these pronouncements to affirm that there is no special need to carry the weapon outside the home could be used to admit the carrying of the kirpan instead, especially if assessed from a more anthropological perspective.[7]
In this debate, a point of favour is certainly to be assigned to the Italian Sikh community, which rather than exacerbating the conflict has recently tried to adapt its traditions to Italian legal culture by proposing to its faithful the use of a kirpan model that complies with Italian legislation on the carrying of offensive objects. This adaptation can be seen in an opinion of the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato sez. I - 29/10/2021, no. 1685) on the recognition of legal personality of a Sikh association, in which a specific model of ritual dagger, approved as non-offensive by the National Proof House[8] (act prot. no. 525 of 16 December 2016) and also in the articles of association of the Unione Sikh Italia, which, in its preamble, identifies the 'Kirpan' as the 'inoffensive replica and consistent with Italian provisions of a ritual object, simulacrum of a dagger and symbol of respect and moral integrity, with dimensions that make it not suitable for causing offence to the person.'

notes

[1] In Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the possibility of taking the kirpan to school and admitted it.

[2] Court of Cremona, 19/02/2009, no. 15; Court of Piacenza, 24/11/2014.

[3] Law No. 110/1975; Article 4. 'Carrying of weapons or objects likely to cause offence'. Paragraph II: 'Without a justified reason, you may not carry, outside your home or its belongings, sticks with a sharp point, pointed or cutting instruments capable of giving offence, clubs, pipes, chains, slings, bolts, metal balls, as well as any other instrument not expressly considered as a pointed or cutting weapon, clearly usable, due to the circumstances of time and place, to offend the person.'

[4] As reiterated also in the constitutional pronouncement that the Court of Cassation in this specific case recalls to corroborate the pre-eminent force of the values of public order and security, no. 63/2016, concerning religious building issues. In this pronouncement, it is stated that freedom of worship may be restricted on the grounds of public order and security, but through the state legislative instrument and not the regional one.

[5] Morelli, 2017; Nico, 2017; Introvigne, 2017.

[6] With Legislative Decree No. 204 of 26 October 2010, the punishment originally provided for the violation of Article 4(2), corresponding to imprisonment from one month to one year and a fine from EUR 51 to EUR 206, was aggravated to an arrest from six months to two years and a fine from EUR 1,000 to EUR 10,000.

[7] For example: 'lawful rules of conduct' could be understood as the same freedom of worship, admitted in the constitution by Art. 8; 19; by Art. 2 itself.; the nature and function of the object would be identified in the symbolic meaning of taking the side of the weakest and of justice, not in a sense of armed struggle, but more ethically, as a promise of faith; the manner of occurrence of the fact as well as the circumstances of the place, as evinced by the rulings dealt with, never concern episodes of confrontation or threat but Sikhs carrying out their daily activities; the subjective conditions of the bearer could refer not only to religious affiliation, but also to the subject's level of inclusion in the host community.

[8] An institute that assesses the characteristics and compliance of arms and ammunition with technical and legal standards and can be considered the 'registry office' of all arms produced in Italy and a large part of those imported. Source: https://www.bancoprova.it/it/banco_nazionale_di_prova-armi_da_fuoco-portatili-munizioni_commerciali/